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Abstract
& Past experience is hypothesized to reduce computational
demands in PFC by providing bottom–up predictive in-
formation that informs subsequent stimulus-action mapping.
The present fMRI study measured cortical activity reductions
(‘‘neural priming’’/‘‘repetition suppression’’) during repeated
stimulus classification to investigate the mechanisms through
which learning from the past decreases demands on the pre-
frontal executive system. Manipulation of learning at three
levels of representation—stimulus, decision, and response—
revealed dissociable neural priming effects in distinct fronto-
temporal regions, supporting a multiprocess model of neural
priming. Critically, three distinct patterns of neural priming
were identified in lateral frontal cortex, indicating that frontal
computational demands are reduced by three forms of learn-
ing: (a) cortical tuning of stimulus-specific representations,
(b) retrieval of learned stimulus-decision mappings, and (c)
retrieval of learned stimulus-response mappings. The topo-
graphic distribution of these neural priming effects suggests a
rostrocaudal organization of executive function in lateral fron-
tal cortex. &
INTRODUCTION
Memory for the past provides predictive information
that shapes current thought and action. The influence
of past experience on present behavior often occurs
implicitly—as exemplified by repetition priming—
wherein RTs and accuracy are facilitated when process-
ing repeated compared with novel stimuli (Roediger &
McDermott, 1993; Tulving & Schacter, 1990). At the neu-
ral level, repeated stimulus processing is associated with
decreased neural activity (neural priming/repetition
suppression) in brain regions engaged during initial
stimulus processing (Gabrieli et al., 1996; Demb et al.,
1995; Raichle et al., 1994; Squire et al., 1992; for a re-
view, see Grill-Spector, Henson, & Martin, 2006; Henson,
2003). Within PFC, neural priming is thought to reflect
situations in which goal-relevant behavior is less de-
pendent on ‘‘top–down’’ executive control (Henson &
Rugg, 2003; Badre & Wagner, 2002; Thompson-Schill,
D’Esposito, & Kan, 1999). Specifically, because prefron-
tal control mechanisms are recruited in situations of un-
certainty (Thompson-Schill & Botvinick, 2006; Miller &
Cohen, 2001), neural priming in PFC may reflect the
benefits of reduced uncertainty that emerge when learn-
ing from the past provides greater ‘‘bottom–up’’ predic-
tive information. Although neural priming in PFC is
generally regarded as reflecting decreased demands on
executive control, the mechanism by which past experi-
ence confers prefrontal computational savings is still a
matter of debate, being alternatively characterized as
stemming from cortical tuning (Henson, 2003; Wiggs &
Martin, 1998) or stimulus-response learning (Horner &
Henson, 2008; Schacter, Wig, & Stevens, 2007; Dobbins,
Schnyer, Verfaellie, & Schacter, 2004). The present fMRI
study aimed to delineate the nature of neural priming
in PFC, with the goal of specifying the forms of learn-
ing that give rise to computational savings in distinct
substrates of the prefrontal executive system.
For over a decade, the cortical tuning hypothesis has
been the dominant account of neural priming effects.
From this perspective, initial stimulus processing leads to
the development of sparser or strengthened cortical rep-
resentations, which decreases computational demands
during subsequent stimulus processing (Grill-Spector
et al., 2006; Henson, 2003; Wiggs & Martin, 1998). For
example, fMRI studies of conceptual priming—that is, fa-
cilitated access to stimulus meaning stemming from prior
processing of stimulus meaning—have revealed activity
reductions in left frontotemporal regions involved in the
representation (posterior middle temporal and fusiform
cortical areas) and the controlled retrieval (ventrolateral
PFC; VLPFC) of semantic knowledge (e.g., Gold, Balota,
Kirchhoff, & Buckner, 2005; Buckner et al., 1998; Wagner,
Desmond, Demb, Glover, & Gabrieli, 1997; Demb et al.,
1995). According to the cortical tuning hypothesis, prior
stimulus processing during priming paradigms serves toStanford University
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tune cortical representations, such that conceptual, lexi-
cal, and perceptual features of the stimulus are more
sharply or strongly represented. This ‘‘tuning’’ of stimulus-
specific representations is thought to enable subsequent
stimulus processing to occur in a more ‘‘bottom–up’’
manner, resulting in a concomitant reduction in demands
on ‘‘top–down’’ biasing from the PFC executive system
(hence the accompanying neural priming in VLPFC).
The cortical tuning hypothesis has been challenged
by recent data that indicate that neural and behavioral
priming at least partially reflect the benefits of a differ-
ent mechanism—response learning—wherein action se-
lection is facilitated through the retrieval of a previous
response that has become associated with a stimulus
(Horner & Henson, 2008; Schnyer et al., 2007; Bunzeck,
Schutze, & Duzel, 2006; Schnyer, Dobbins, Nicholls,
Schacter, & Verfaellie, 2006; Dobbins et al., 2004; Logan,
1990). The response-learning hypothesis has its roots
in instance theories of automaticity, in which the for-
mation and the automatic retrieval of stimulus-response
associations provide a direct route to action, enabling
the bypassing of slower, more deliberate processing
stages (Logan, 1988, 1990). From this perspective, neu-
ral activity reductions in left frontotemporal regions
during repeated semantic classification of a stimulus
mark a processing shift away from retrieval and analysis
of stimulus-level conceptual features to direct response
retrieval that is enabled by a learned stimulus-response
association (Dobbins et al., 2004; Schacter, Dobbins,
& Schnyer, 2004). Thus, neural priming within the PFC
executive system may partially reflect the bypassing of
VLPFC control processes that support controlled se-
mantic retrieval.
The response-learning hypothesis was supported by
two recent fMRI studies in which behavioral and neural
priming were disrupted when subjects could not rely
on learned ‘‘stimulus-response’’ associations to make
semantic classifications about repeated stimuli (Horner
& Henson, 2008; Dobbins et al., 2004). For example,
Dobbins et al. (2004) had subjects repeatedly classify
visually presented objects (e.g., a picture of a HOUSE)
according to one of two classification rules (either ‘‘Big-
ger than a shoebox?’’ or ‘‘Smaller than a shoebox?’’). In
the key manipulation, the classification rule was either
held constant across stimulus repetitions (e.g., ‘‘Bigger’’
! ‘‘Bigger’’) or was inverted across stimulus repeti-
tions (e.g., ‘‘Bigger’’ ! ‘‘Smaller’’). Strikingly, the re-
sults revealed robust behavioral and neural priming
when the classification rule was held constant but dis-
rupted behavioral priming and a concomitant reduction
of neural priming in left VLPFC [!Brodmann’s areas
(BA) 9/44 and 45] and elimination of neural priming in
left fusiform cortex (!BA 19/37) when the rule was in-
verted. Importantly, because the targeted concept (e.g.,
HOUSE) was the same irrespective of the sign of the
classification rule, Dobbins et al. argue that the disrup-
tion of behavioral and neural priming following rule in-
version resulted from the need to reengage in stimulus-
level processing because subjects could no longer use
learned ‘‘responses’’ as an alternate route to action. Con-
versely, when ‘‘stimulus-response’’ mappings were held
constant, subjects could directly retrieve the learned ‘‘re-
sponse,’’ thus bypassing stimulus-level processing medi-
ated by left frontotemporal regions (Horner & Henson,
2008; Dobbins et al., 2004; Schacter et al., 2004).
Although the response-learning hypothesis provides a
fundamental challenge to accounts of PFC priming that
focus exclusively on mechanisms of cortical tuning, ex-
tant data do not specify the nature of the acquired as-
sociative representations that give rise to neural priming.
In particular, prior stimulus classification may result in
the learning of a stimulus-decision association that re-
lates the stimulus to a particular classification decision
(e.g., HOUSE–‘‘Bigger’’) or to a particular task (e.g.,
HOUSE–‘‘Bigger than?’’); such learning would enable
priming by facilitating subsequent decision selection
(Schnyer et al., 2007; Logan, 1990). Alternatively, prior
stimulus classification may result in the learning of a
stimulus-response association (e.g., HOUSE–‘‘yes’’ or
HOUSE–‘‘left button press’’) that facilitates subsequent
response selection (Dobbins et al., 2004).
At the behavioral level, published data alternately
suggest that the associations underlying ‘‘response-
learning’’ effects are between stimuli and abstract deci-
sions (Schnyer et al., 2007; Waszak, Hommel, & Allport,
2003; Logan, 1990) or between stimuli and responses
(Dobbins et al., 2004; for a discussion, see Hommel,
2007; Schacter et al., 2007). At the neural level, even less
is known about the form of associative learning giving
rise to neural priming because the experimental designs
or the analysis approaches in prior fMRI studies support-
ing the response-learning hypothesis were insufficient
for distinguishing the effects of stimulus-decision learn-
ing from those of stimulus-response learning (Horner &
Henson, 2008; Dobbins et al., 2004; Wagner, Koutstaal,
Maril, Schacter, & Buckner, 2000; Thompson-Schill
et al., 1999). For example, in the Dobbins et al. (2004)
study, the design covaried associative learning at multiple
levels of representation, such that the observed neural
priming could reflect the benefits of learned stimulus-
decision mappings, learned stimulus-response mappings,
or some combination of the two. Independent manipu-
lation of repetition at the decision and the response levels
is required to determine whether response-learning effects
on neural priming stem from decision- versus response-
related repetition (Schnyer et al., 2007) or, alternatively,
whether these forms of repetition have unique and dis-
sociable neural processing consequences.
The response-learning hypothesis—and associated
fMRI observations of a single pattern of neural priming
in left VLPFC (Horner & Henson, 2008; Dobbins et al.,
2004)—also challenge emerging theories of PFC execu-
tive function that posit that multiple forms of cognitive
control are subserved by distinct subregions of lateral
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frontal cortex (Danker, Gunn, & Anderson, in press;
Badre & D’Esposito, 2007; Badre & Wagner, 2007;
Koechlin & Summerfield, 2007; Gold et al., 2006). In par-
ticular, initial fMRI evidence for the response-learning
hypothesis suggests that multiple subregions of left
VLPFC—inferior frontal pars opercularis and pars tri-
angularis (Dobbins et al., 2004) and inferior frontal
pars orbitalis and pars opercularis (Horner & Henson,
2008)—demonstrate neural priming because stimulus-
level processing is bypassed in favor of decision or re-
sponse retrieval. These findings appear to challenge Badre
and Wagner’s (2007) two-process hypothesis of VLPFC
functional organization, wherein left anterior VLPFC ( pars
orbitalis; area 47) biases processing in lateral and ven-
tral temporal cortex in service of controlled retrieval of
semantic knowledge, whereas left mid-VLPFC ( pars tri-
angularis; area 45) mediates selection between com-
peting active representations in service of goal-directed
action (Badre & Wagner, 2006, 2007; Badre, Poldrack,
Pare-Blagoev, Insler, & Wagner, 2005; Dobbins & Wagner,
2005; see also, Danker et al., in press; Gold et al.,
2006). Viewed from this perspective, past experience can
produce learning at multiple levels of representations—
conceptual, stimulus decision, and/or stimulus response—
that differentially alters subsequent demands on distinct
subcomponents of the prefrontal executive system. Res-
olution of this fundamental issue can only be derived
through independent measures of neural priming that
stems from stimulus-level learning, stimulus-decision
learning, and stimulus-response learning.
To understand how multiple forms of learning influ-
ence subsequent demands on distinct components of
the prefrontal executive system, we conducted an fMRI
study of priming that manipulated repetition at three lev-
els: (a) stimulus repetition, (b) stimulus-decision repe-
tition, and (c) stimulus-response repetition. Throughout
the experiment, participants made one of two semantic
classification decisions about words, making a yes/no re-
sponse for each stimulus by pressing one of two keys
(Figure 1A). On each trial, a stimulus appeared with a task
cue (e.g., ‘‘SMALLER?’’ or ‘‘ORGANIC?’’) that indicated
the decision to be made for that trial. During the study
phase, stimuli were presented three times (repeated
items) over the course of three blocks (intermixed with
novel items during the second and the third block). Im-
portantly, the task paired with each repeated item was
held constant across the three study repetitions, yielding
primed items for which stimulus processing, stimulus-
decision mappings, and stimulus-response mappings
were repeated three times.
During a subsequent critical test phase, all of the re-
peated items were represented along with a set of novel
items using an event-related fMRI design. The level of rep-
etition for each of the repeated items was manipulated
Figure 1. Task schematic
and behavioral measures of
priming. (A) During study,
each item was presented
with the same decision cue
three times, and subjects
pressed one of two buttons
to indicate a ‘‘yes’’ (Y) or
‘‘no’’ (N) response. At test,
items presented at study were
presented again either with
the same cue (within-task)
or a different cue (across-task).
Of the across-task trials,
half required the same
response as at study (AT-RR)
and half required a different
response (AT-RS). (B) The
four test conditions differed
according to repetition at the
stimulus, stimulus-decision,
and stimulus-response levels.
(C) Test phase RTs (restricted
to correct trials) differed
across conditions, revealing
behavioral priming on
within-task (W) and AT-RR
trials compared with novel
(N) and AT-RS trials; priming
was also greater on W
than on AT-RR trials. In all
figures, error bars ref lect
within-subject standard error.
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by varying the relationship between the tasks performed
at study and test (Figure 1A). Half of the repeated items
were classified according to the same decision task as
at study (within-task repetition), whereas half were now
classified according to the other decision task (across-
task repetition). Of the across-task items, half required
the same response as at study (response-repeat), and half
now required a different response (response-switch). In
this manner, the level of repetition between study and
test varied across conditions (Figure 1B): (a) within-task
trials contained repetition at the stimulus, decision, and
response levels; (b) across-task response-repeat (AT-RR)
trials contained repetition at the stimulus and response
levels; (c) across-task response-switch (AT-RS) trials con-
tained repetition only at the stimulus level; and (d) novel
trials served as baseline items that did not contain any
level of repetition. All analyses focused on the data from
this critical test phase.
Given the independent manipulation of stimulus
repetition, stimulus-decision repetition, and stimulus-
response repetition, the experimental design allowed
us to address two key questions. First, is the pattern of
neural priming in lateral frontal cortex consistent across
anatomical subregions or, alternatively, are dissociable
patterns of neural priming present across distinct fron-
tal subregions in a manner compatible with a multipro-
cess model of prefrontal executive function? Second, do
‘‘response-learning’’ effects on neural priming reflect
stimulus-decision learning or stimulus-response learn-
ing, or are there distinct neural consequences of each
form of learning on frontal computational demands?
The answers to these questions directly bear on current
theories of neural priming and of the functional organi-
zation of the prefrontal executive system.
METHODS
Participants
Twenty-six right-handed, native English speakers partici-
pated in the study (mean age = 22 years, range = 18–
35 years). Data from two additional participants were col-
lected but excluded due to poor behavioral performance
(>35% nonresponses in one case and <65% accuracy
across all conditions in the other case). Participants re-
ceived $20/hr for participation, with the experiment last-
ing approximately 3 hr. Participants were recruited from
the Stanford University community and the surrounding
area and gave informed consent in accordance with pro-
cedures approved by the Stanford University Institutional
Review Board.
Stimuli
The stimulus set consisted of 512 nouns (mean word
length = 6.2 letters; mean word frequency = 12.7/million).
Half of the words referred to organic objects and half
to inorganic objects. For both the organic and the in-
organic words, half referred to objects smaller than a
13-in. box and half to larger objects. The stimuli were
divided into eight lists of 64 words, matched for mean
word length and frequency, and containing 16 words
from each of the organic/inorganic " smaller/ larger
crossings. For each participant, four of these lists served
as repeated items that were studied three times during
encoding, two lists served as novel items studied once
during encoding, and two lists served as novel items
at test. Across participants, lists were counterbalanced
across conditions.
Behavioral Procedure
The experiment proper consisted of three study blocks
and a final test. fMRI data were collected during all
blocks, with the present analyses focusing on data from
the critical test block. Instructions and practice were
given prior to the start of the experiment.
The same trial structure was maintained across study
and test blocks. On each trial, a task cue and a target
word were presented for 1 sec followed by a 2-sec fix-
ation (‘‘+’’). Task cues appeared in uppercase letters
above a central fixation cross and indicated which of
two semantic decisions was to be made for the target
word that appeared below the cross in lowercase let-
ters (Figure 1A). For the size decision task, the cue
‘‘SMALLER?’’ or ‘‘LARGER?’’ appeared, whereas the cue
‘‘ORGANIC?’’ or ‘‘INORGANIC?’’ appeared for the com-
position task. Each participant was presented with only
one of the two possible cues for each classification task
throughout the duration of the experiment (i.e., the same
participant never encountered both ‘‘SMALLER?’’ and
‘‘LARGER?’’ trials nor ‘‘ORGANIC?’’ and ‘‘INORGANIC?’’
trials). During each 3-sec trial, participants were in-
structed to respond as quickly and accurately as possi-
ble by making a ‘‘yes’’ or ‘‘no’’ keypress on a button
box under their right middle or index fingers. The cue
used for each task and the order of classification deci-
sions were counterbalanced across participants. Within
subjects, conditions were pseudorandomized to ensure
that the same cue or response did not repeat more
than three times in a row. Trials were distributed in
an event-related manner, separated in time by variable-
duration null events (0–7.5 sec). During null events, par-
ticipants indicated the direction of leftward or rightward
pointing arrows by pressing the left or the right key on
the button box (Stark & Squire, 2001).
During each study block, participants classified 256
words—128 under the size task and 128 under the com-
position task. The same 256 words appeared in each
of the three study blocks, with their order randomized
within each study block. As stated above, for a given
participant, the task cue associated with each word was
held constant across the three study blocks. During both
the second and the third study blocks, 64 novel words
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were presented once along with the 256 repeatedly
studied words.
During the critical final test block, the 256 repeatedly
encountered words from the study blocks were repre-
sented along with 128 novel words that had not been
previously presented. Of the 256 repeated words, half
were presented with the same cue as at study, requir-
ing the same classification and response as at study
(within-task), whereas the other half were presented
with the other task cue, requiring a decision switch from
either a size-to-composition or a composition-to-size de-
cision (across-task). Of the 128 across-task words, half
required the same response as was previously appropri-
ate during the study blocks (AT-RR), whereas the other
half required a different response (AT-RS; Figure 1).
fMRI Methods
Whole-brain imaging was collected on a 3.0T Signa MRI
system (GE Medical Systems). Functional images were
collected using a T2*-weighted two-dimensional gradient-
echo spiral-in/out pulse sequence (TR = 1.5 sec; TE =
30 msec; 22 axial-oblique slices; one interleave; flip an-
gle = 758; FOV = 22 cm; 64 " 64 voxels; 5-mm through
plane) (Glover & Law, 2001). Eight discarded volumes
(12 sec) were collected at the beginning of each scan to
allow for T1 stabilization. High-resolution T1-weighted
(SPGR) anatomical images were collected for anatomical
visualization. Head motion was restricted with a bite bar
and padding surrounding the head.
Data were preprocessed using SPM2 (Wellcome De-
partment of Cognitive Neurology, London). Functional
images were corrected for differences in slice acquisition
timing followed by motion correction using sinc interpo-
lation. Participants’ structural images were coregistered
to their functional images and segmented into gray mat-
ter, white matter, and cerebrospinal fluid. The gray mat-
ter images were then stripped of any remaining skull
and spatially normalized to a gray matter template im-
age based on MNI stereotactic space. Normalization
of the structural and functional images was based on
this normalized gray matter image. Functional images
were resampled into 3-mm cubic voxels and spatially
smoothed with a Gaussian kernel (6-mm FWHM).
Statistical models were constructed with SPM2 un-
der the assumptions of the general linear model. Cor-
rect and incorrect trials associated with each condition
(novel, within-task, AT-RR, and AT-RS) were modeled
as events. Motion parameters, linear trends, and ses-
sion were all entered as nuisance covariates. Linear con-
trasts were used to obtain participant-specific estimates
for each effect. These estimates were entered into a
second-level analysis, treating subjects as a random ef-
fect, using a one-sample t test against a contrast value of
zero at each voxel. All statistical contrasts were restricted
to correct trials. Voxel-based group effects in a priori
expected frontal and temporal regions were considered
significant if they (a) exceeded an uncorrected threshold
of p < .001 and consisted of five or more contiguous
voxels and (b) survived small-volume correction.
Given numerous prior observations of neural priming in
left VLPFC and premotor cortex, as well as in left posterior
middle temporal and left fusiform cortical areas, during
conceptual priming paradigms, we had specific a priori
targeted ROIs. Accordingly, voxel-level effects within these
a priori predicted regions were small-volume corrected
for multiple comparisons using anatomical masks drawn
from a standard database [Anatomical Automatic Label-
ing (AAL); http://www.cyceron.fr/freeware/] or from foci
identified in prior published articles. For left VLPFC, a sin-
gle mask was created by combining the three separate
AAL masks for inferior frontal pars orbitalis, inferior
frontal pars triangularis, and inferior frontal pars
opercularis. For left premotor cortex, we used the AAL
mask for precentral gyrus. Conservative masks for left
posterior middle temporal cortex and left fusiform cortex
were created by defining 24-mm-diameter spheres cen-
tered at previously identified middle temporal cortex
(MNI-converted coordinates: #54, #45, #4; Gold et al.,
2006) and fusiform cortex (#45, #54, #24; Simons,
Koutstaal, Prince, Wagner, & Schacter, 2003) peaks asso-
ciated with conceptual priming.
ROI analyses supplemented group-level voxel-based
contrasts. ROIs included all significant voxels within
a 6-mm radius of a maximum. Deconvolution of the
BOLD signal within ROIs was performed using a finite
impulse response function implemented with MarsBar
(http://marsbar.sourceforge.net). Integrated percent sig-
nal change associated with each condition was com-
puted around the peak response plus and minus one TR
(corresponding to 3–7.5 sec posttrial onset). The resul-
tant data were submitted to repeated measures ANOVAs,
using the Huynh–Feldt correction where appropriate.
All coordinates are reported in MNI space. For display
purposes, FreeSurfer (CorTechs Labs, Inc.; Dale, Fischl,
& Sereno, 1999; Fischl, Sereno, & Dale, 1999) was used
to render group contrasts, overlaid on a surface rep-
resentation of the MNI canonical brain (I. Kahn; http://
spmsurfrend.sourceforge.net).
RESULTS
Behavioral Repetition Effects
The median RT was determined per condition, restricted
to correct trials, and submitted to analysis. During the
study phase, repetition priming was observed as faster
RTs on repeated compared with novel trials, both after
one repetition, F(1,25) = 40.04, p < .001, and after two
repetitions, F(1,25) = 39.10, p < .001. During the criti-
cal test phase, the nature of repetition between study
and test modulated behavioral priming, F(3,75) = 31.75,
p < .001 (Figure 1C). Specifically, compared with novel
trials, RTs were faster on both within-task and AT-RR
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trials, Fs(1,25) > 21.38, ps < .001, but not on AT-RS trials
(F < 1). RTs for within-task were faster than for AT-RR
trials, F(1,25) = 15.21, p < .001, revealing the benefits
of stimulus-decision repetition during the within-task
condition. Moreover, behavioral priming for AT-RR trials,
whereas less than that for within-task trials, was also evi-
dent in faster RTs compared with AT-RS trials, F(1,25) =
17.50, p < .001. This AT-RR priming effect provides evi-
dence that stimulus-response learning also can facilitate
behavior even when stimulus-decision mappings change
between study and test. Importantly, when task (size/
composition) was included as a factor, all of the above
effects remained significant ( ps < .05), and there was no
effect of task on the pattern of RTs across conditions
(Task " Condition interaction, F < 1). The effect of con-
dition on accuracy at test was similar to that seen for
RTs, with higher accuracy for within-task (92%) and AT-
RR (94%) compared with both novel (89%) and AT-RS
(75%) trials ( ps < .001).
Within-task Repetition and Neural Priming
To validate our paradigm, we first contrasted BOLD ac-
tivity on novel and within-task trials (all fMRI analyses
were restricted to correct trials). This comparison iden-
tified neural priming that could derive from repetition
at any of the three manipulated levels of processing:
stimulus, decision, or response. Consistent with previ-
ous studies of neural priming during repeated semantic
classification (e.g., Wig, Grafton, Demos, & Kelley, 2005;
Dobbins et al., 2004; Buckner, Koutstaal, Schacter, &
Rosen, 2000; Wagner, Maril, & Schacter, 2000; Buckner
et al., 1998; Gabrieli et al., 1996; Demb et al., 1995), ac-
tivity reductions were observed in multiple left fronto-
temporal cortical regions, including VLPFC, posterior
middle temporal cortex, fusiform gyrus, and premotor
cortex ( p < .001, five-voxel extent; all ps < .005, small-
volume corrected; Figure 2A). A qualitatively similar pat-
tern was observed when separately comparing novel >
within-task trials for each task (size/composition), and
an interaction analysis confirmed that neural priming
in left frontotemporal regions did not interact with
task. Accordingly, all subsequent fMRI analyses were col-
lapsed across task, thus affording greater power.
Stimulus-level Repetition Effects
Motivated by the two-process model of left VLPFC func-
tion (Badre & Wagner, 2007) and by the literature im-
plicating left posterior middle temporal and fusiform
cortical areas in semantic processing (e.g., Gold et al.,
2006; Badre et al., 2005; Gold et al., 2005; Wheatley,
Weisberg, Beauchamp, & Martin, 2005; Simons et al.,
2003; Thompson-Schill et al., 1999; Hodges, Patterson,
Oxbury, & Funnell, 1992), we hypothesized that stimulus-
level learning would give rise to neural priming in re-
gions associated with the representation of long-term
conceptual knowledge (left posterior middle temporal
cortex and fusiform) and the controlled retrieval of
that knowledge (left anterior VLPFC; !area 47, inferior
frontal pars orbitalis). Analytically, neural regions sen-
sitive to stimulus repetition were expected to show re-
duced activation for all repeated conditions relative to
novel trials (Figure 1B).
Consistent with these predictions, the contrast of
novel > all repeated trials revealed neural priming in
a left-lateralized frontotemporal network that was a sub-
set of that identified in the novel > within-task contrast
(Figure 2B, red; Table 1). Specifically, the novel > all
repeated contrast identified neural priming in a priori
predicted regions in left anterior VLPFC (!area 47: #42,
33, #3), left posterior middle temporal cortex (!BA 21:
#54, #42, 3), and left fusiform cortex (!BA 37: #45,
#63, #24; p < .001, five-voxel extent; all ps < .01, small-
volume corrected). Confirmatory ROI analyses in each of
these a priori predicted regions revealed neural prim-
ing during all of the repeated conditions, with signifi-
cant activation reductions during both within-task and
across-task trials compared with novel trials, Fs(1,25) >
11.77, ps < .005 (Figure 2C). Moreover, neural priming
was observed when separately comparing AT-RR and
AT-RS trials to novel trials: activation reductions during
AT-RR were significant in all regions, Fs(1,25) > 6.61,
ps < .05; similarly, the reductions during AT-RS trials
were significant in left anterior VLPFC and left fusi-
form cortex, Fs(1,25) > 8.11, ps < .01, and approached
significance in left posterior middle temporal cortex,
F(1,25) = 3.13, p = .09 (Figure 2C). Collectively, these
data provide compelling evidence for stimulus-level neu-
ral priming even in the absence of stimulus-decision or
stimulus-response learning (i.e., there were significant
activation reductions in these regions even on AT-RR
and AT-RS trials).
In addition to the robust effects of stimulus-level
learning, further analyses revealed that the magnitude
of neural priming in the left anterior VLPFC ROI was also
greater when decisions were repeated (within-task) than
when decisions changed (across-task), F(1,25) = 10.52,
p< .005. Interestingly, this effect appeared to stem from
the presence of a more sustained response in this region
during the across-task relative to the within-task trials
(Figure 3).
Stimulus-decision Repetition Effects
We next sought to determine whether subregions of
lateral frontal cortex demonstrate neural priming that
uniquely stems from stimulus-decision learning. One
possibility is that decision-specific neural priming would
be observed in more caudal subregions of left VLPFC
(!BA 45, inferior frontal pars triangularis; !BA 44, in-
ferior frontal pars opercularis), given the locus of prior
rule-inversion effects (Dobbins et al., 2004; but see,
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Horner & Henson, 2008), as well as the two-process
model of left VLPFC function that implicates left mid-
VLPFC in goal-relevant selection (Badre et al., 2005;
Dobbins & Wagner, 2005). Regions sensitive to stimulus-
decision repetition were expected to show reduced ac-
tivity specific to within-task trials, the only condition in
which decisions were repeated from study to test (Fig-
ure 1B). We isolated the effects of decision-related rep-
etition from those of response-related repetition by
contrasting activity on within-task trials to that on AT-RR
trials because the only difference between these two trial
types was the presence (within-task) versus the absence
(AT-RR) of decision-level repetition.
The AT-RR > within-task contrast (Figure 2B, cyan;
Table 1) revealed decision-related neural priming in left
middle and posterior VLPFC (mid/post-VLPFC),
corresponding to inferior frontal pars triangularis
(!BA 45) and pars opercularis (!BA 44; p < .001,
five-voxel extent; all ps < .01, small-volume corrected;
similar left VLPFC foci were also identified when con-
trasting all across-task > within-task trials). ROI analyses
confirmed that the specificity of these activity decreases
to within-task trials in both the rostral (!BA 45; #51, 36,
12) and the caudal (!BA 45/44; #45, 15, 24) foci within
mid-VLPFC. Specifically, in both ROIs, activity during
within-task trials was significantly reduced compared
Figure 2. Dissociable neural
priming effects due to
stimulus repetition and
stimulus-decision repetition.
(A) The contrast of novel >
within-task trials, rendered
on an inf lated MNI canonical
surface, revealed neural
priming effects in a priori
predicted left frontotemporal
regions ( p < .001, five-voxel
extent). (B) Stimulus-level
repetition reductions (novel >
all repeated, p < .001,
five-voxel extent; red) were
observed in left anterior
VLPFC, left middle temporal
cortex, and left fusiform
regions. By contrast,
decision-level repetition
reductions (AT-RR >
within-task, p < .001, five-voxel
extent; cyan) were observed
in left mid/post-VLPFC.
(C) Data extracted from (1)
left anterior VLPFC (#42, 33,
#3), (2) left middle temporal
cortex (#54, #42, 3), and
(3) left fusiform (#45, #63,
#24) ROIs identified in the
novel > all repeated contrast
confirmed that these regions
demonstrated neural priming
across all three repeated
conditions. (D) Data extracted
from (4) left mid-VLPFC
(#51, 36, 12) and (5) left mid/
post-VLPFC (#45, 15, 24) ROIs
from the AT-RR > within-task
contrast confirmed that
these regions demonstrated
decision-specific neural
priming for within-task trials.
Note that for panels C and
D, neural priming relative
to novel trials is denoted
by ***p $ .005, **p < .01,
*p < .05, !p < .10. (E) The regions associated with stimulus and stimulus-decision priming dissociated according to whether neural priming
was observed on across-task trials (novel–across-task; ***p < .005). Note that the left post-VLPFC region identified in both the novel > all
repeated and the AT-RR > within-task contrasts (#45, 9, 21; B, purple) showed a mixed decision/response pattern.
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with all other trial types (novel, AT-RR, and AT-RS),
Fs(1,25) > 17.36, ps < .001, which, in turn, did not dif-
fer from each other ( ps > .2; Figure 2D). Importantly,
activation in these regions during across-task trials did
not differ from that during novel trials (Fs < 1). Collec-
tively, the within-task specificity of neural priming in
left mid/post-VLPFC provides strong evidence for the
contribution of stimulus-decision learning to neural repe-
tition effects independent of stimulus-level and stimulus-
response learning.
Importantly, these data suggest a functional dissocia-
tion between decision-specific repetition effects in left
mid/post-VLPFC and stimulus-level repetition effects in
left anterior VLPFC. This dissociation along the rostro-
caudal axis of lateral PFC was confirmed by significant
Region " Condition interactions between left anterior
VLPFC and both the left mid-VLPFC and the left mid/
post-VLPFC foci, F(3,75) = 8.08, p < .001, and F(3,75) =
4.74, p < .01, respectively. Similarly, dissociations were
observed between these left mid/post-VLPFC regions and
the left middle temporal cortex and fusiform regions that
were sensitive to stimulus repetition, Fs(3,75) > 4.97,
ps < .005. As all regions demonstrated repetition-related
reductions during within-task trials, these across-region
dissociations reflect the presence of significant across-
task neural priming in left anterior VLPFC, posterior mid-
dle temporal cortex, and fusiform cortex and the absence
of such effects in left mid/post-VLPFC (Figure 2E).
Stimulus-response Repetition Effects
Although the preceding analyses revealed dissociable
neural priming effects following stimulus and stimulus-
decision repetition, they do not address the possible ad-
ditional contributions of stimulus-response learning to
neural priming. One possibility is that response-level prim-
ing would be observed in caudal frontal regions, at or
near premotor cortex, that have been previously associ-
ated with response selection processes that mediate the
mapping of stimuli to actions (Badre & D’Esposito, 2007;
Koechlin, Ody, & Kouneiher, 2003; Bunge, Hazeltine,
Scanlon, Rosen, & Gabrieli, 2002). Analytically, to inves-
tigate this possibility, we contrasted activity for the two
across-task conditions, as these conditions only differed
with respect to whether responses were repeated (AT-RR)
or switched (AT-RS) from study to test (Figure 1B).
The AT-RS > AT-RR contrast (Figure 4A, green; Table 1)
revealed effects in left premotor cortex (!BA 6), left ACC
(!BA 24), right dorsal premotor cortex (PMd; !BA 6),
and right OFC (!BA 47/11; p < .001, five-voxel extent).
ROI analyses confirmed the presence of activity reduc-
tions for AT-RR compared AT-RS trials in all of these
regions, Fs(1,25) > 10.68, ps < .005. Interestingly, this
AT-RS versus AT-RR difference was not consistently
driven by a reduction in activity on AT-RR trials, as some
regions demonstrated an increase on AT-RS trials rela-
tive to novel trials. In particular, the most superior
region of left PMd (!BA 6: #24, 0, 66) displayed greater
activity during AT-RS trials than during all other trial
types, Fs(1,25) > 10.57, ps < .005, which in turn did not
differ from each other (Figure 4B; Fs < 1). This in-
creased activity during AT-RS trials may reflect situations
in which primed responses are no longer valid and must
be overridden (i.e., response competition).
To explore possible response facilitation effects com-
mon to the within-task and the AT-RR trials that may
have been obscured by the lower power inherent in the
AT-RS > AT-RR contrast (due to these conditions con-
taining the fewest number of trials), we computed a
conjunction analysis across the orthogonal contrasts of
AT-RS > AT-RR and novel > within-task (both at p <
.005, yielding a conjoint p < .000025, five-voxel extent).
Table 1. A Priori Left Frontal and Temporal Regions
Demonstrating Neural Priming Effects
MNI Coordinates (x, y, z) !BA
Novel > All Repeated
L anterior VLPFC #42 33 #3 47
L anterior VLPFC #45 42 #9 47
L posterior VLPFC #45 9 21 44
L middle temporal cortex #54 #42 3 21
L fusiform gyrus #45 #63 #24 37
L fusiform gyrus #39 #48 #27 37/20
L fusiform gyrus #33 #33 #21 37/20
L fusiform gyrus #33 #33 #30 37/20
L fusiform gyrus #45 #57 #12 37/19
L fusiform gyrus #45 #51 #15 37/19
AT-RR > Within-task
L mid-VLPFC #51 36 12 45
L mid-VLPFC #48 33 0 45
L mid/post-VLPFC #45 15 24 45/44
L mid/post-VLPFC #51 12 15 45/44
AT-RS > AT-RR
L PMd #24 0 66 6
L premotor #39 #6 54 6
L ACC #12 18 30 24
Conjunction: Novel > Within-task and AT-RS > AT-RR
L premotor/post-VLPFC #39 0 39 6/44
L pre-SMA #9 9 51 6
Main contrasts, p < .001, five-voxel extent; conjunction analysis, p <
.000025, five-voxel extent.
Race, Shanker, and Wagner 1773
Note that the one factor manipulation common to these
contrasts was whether the stimulus-response mappings
were novel (AT-RS and novel conditions) or repeated
(AT-RR and within-task conditions). This analysis re-
vealed response facilitation effects in two regions—left
premotor/posterior VLPFC (!BA 6/44:#39, 0, 39; p< .05,
small-volume corrected) and left pre-SMA (!BA 6: #9,
9, 51) (Figure 4A, orange; Table 1). Confirmatory ROI
analyses demonstrated that activity in these regions was
reduced for both within-task and AT-RR trials compared
with novel and AT-RS trials, Fs(1,25) > 4.07, ps $ .05
(Figure 4C). Moreover, activity did not differ between
within-task and AT-RR trials ( ps > .25) nor between novel
and AT-RS trials (Fs < 1).
Collectively, these analyses revealed two types of
response-level influences on neural activity: (1) response
facilitation in left premotor/post-VLPFC and left pre-SMA
that occurs when learned responses are compatible with
current goal-relevant responses, and (2) response com-
petition in left PMd that occurs when learned responses
are no longer appropriate. Significant Region" Condition
interactions were present between left PMd and both
left premotor/post-VLPFC, F(3,75) = 3.12, p < .05, and
pre-SMA, F(3,75) = 3.85, p < .05.
Figure 3. Hemodynamic response functions (in percent signal change) are plotted for each of the four conditions. Data are pooled across all
clusters identified in the contrast of interest. For left mid/post-VLPFC, data are pooled across the mid-VLPFC and the mid/post-VLPFC clusters
(163 voxels) defined in the AT-RR > within-task contrast (Figure 2B, cyan voxels). For left anterior VLPFC, data are pooled across the anterior
VLPFC clusters (33 voxels) defined in the novel > repeated contrast (Figure 2B, red voxels). For left fusiform, data are pooled across all
fusiform clusters (86 voxels) identified in the novel > repeated contrast (Figure 2B, red voxels). The hemodynamic response functions from
anterior VLPFC and fusiform reveal a late divergence between across-task trials (AT-RR and AT-RR) and within-task trials. This divergence may
ref lect feedback from left mid/post-VLPFC onto these conceptual-level regions.
Figure 4. Neural effects of stimulus-response repetition. (A) The contrast of AT-RS > AT-RR ( p < .001, five voxel-extent; green) and the
conjunction of AT-RS > AT-RR and novel > within-task (conjoint p < .000025, five-voxel extent; orange) rendered on an inf lated MNI
canonical surface. (B) A ‘‘response competition’’ effect was observed in (1) the left PMd (#24, 0, 66), wherein activity for AT-RS trials was
greater than all other trial types ( ps < .005). A ‘‘response facilitation’’ effect was observed in both (2) the left premotor/post-VLPFC (#39,
0, 39) and (3) the left pre-SMA (#9, 9, 51), wherein activity was reduced for both conditions in which responses repeated (AT-RR and
within-task) relative to novel and AT-RS trials. Note that for panel B, neural priming relative to novel trials is denoted by ***p < .005,
**p < .01, *p $ .05.
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Importantly, Region " Condition interactions dissoci-
ated the caudal frontal regions demonstrating response-
level effects (left PMd, premotor/post-VLPFC, and pre-SMA)
from (a) the left mid/post-VLPFC regions demonstrat-
ing decision-level priming, Fs(3,75) > 7.79, ps < .001,
and (b) the left anterior VLPFC regions demonstrating
stimulus-level priming, Fs(3,75) > 5.25, ps < .005. To-
gether, these three dissociable neural priming effects
along the rostrocaudal axis of lateral frontal cortex re-
veal that multiple forms of learning serve to reduce de-
mands on distinct components of the frontal executive
system.
Brain–Behavior Correlations
Across subjects, the neural priming effect (i.e., difference
in integrated percent signal change) in each of the eight
primary ROIs (left anterior VLPFC, left posterior middle
temporal cortex, left fusiform cortex, left mid-VLPFC,
left mid/post-VLPFC, left PMd, left premotor/post-VLPFC,
and left pre-SMA) was entered into a multiple regres-
sion to examine the relationship to behavioral priming
(i.e., difference in RT). Multiple regressions computed
on novel–within-task, AT-RR–within-task, and AT-RS–AT-
RR failed to reveal significant brain-behavioral relation-
ships ( ps > .05). Separate analyses of the relationship
between neural priming in each ROI and behavioral
priming revealed only one notable correlation. Specifi-
cally, the magnitude of RT slowing on AT-RS compared
with AT-RR trials positively correlated with the magni-
tude of increased neural activity on AT-RS compared
with AT-RR trials in left PMd (r = .48, p < .05). How-
ever, this correlation did not survive correction for mul-
tiple comparisons (eight regions, p = .11).
DISCUSSION
Learning from past goal-directed behavior can alter the
underlying neural computations supporting subsequent
goal-directed action. The present data demonstrate that
learning can occur at multiple representational levels—
stimulus, stimulus decision, and stimulus response—with
each giving rise to neural priming in distinct regions of
lateral frontal cortex. Three novel findings bear on the
cortical tuning and response-learning hypotheses of neu-
ral priming and illuminate the multicomponent nature of
the frontal executive system.
First, the present functional neuroanatomic disso-
ciations provide strong evidence that neural priming
due to cortical tuning of stimulus-level representations
co-occurs with neural priming stemming from stimulus-
outcome associative learning. Specifically, although
retrieved stimulus-decision and stimulus-response as-
sociations make important and unique contributions to
neural priming in lateral and medial frontal regions,
our data indicate that these additional routes to action
do not circumvent the processing of stimulus-specific
representations in inferior and lateral temporal cortex.
Rather, neural priming was observed in left fusiform
gyrus (see also, Horner & Henson, 2008) and posterior
middle temporal cortex even in the absence of decision
or response repetition, indicating that these effects can-
not be attributed to bypassed stimulus-level processing.
Second, the present data reveal that stimulus-level learn-
ing also contributes to neural priming in left anterior
VLPFC, providing novel evidence that multiple forms
of learning serve to decrease demands on lateral PFC
executive processes. Specifically, the present data are
the first, to our knowledge, to demonstrate that corti-
cal tuning and stimulus-outcome learning reduce com-
putational demands in dissociable regions along the
rostrocaudal axis of left VLPFC. Finally, the present
data provide new evidence that stimulus-decision and
stimulus-response learning result in distinct neural prim-
ing effects in lateral frontal cortex and further demon-
strate that the retrieval of learned responses can yield
both facilitative and competitive effects within lateral
and medial frontal areas. Collectively, these novel find-
ings highlight the multiprocess nature of neural priming
during semantic classification, wherein mechanisms of
cortical tuning, stimulus-decision learning, and stimulus-
response learning operate in tandem to drive experience-
dependent modulations of neural activity.
Cortical Tuning of Stimulus-level Representations
Relative to novel stimuli, neural priming was observed
in left anterior VLPFC, fusiform, and posterior middle
temporal regions for all repeated stimuli (Figure 2B–
C), providing evidence that significant repetition-related
activity reductions can occur even in the absence of
stimulus-decision or stimulus-response repetition. Of par-
ticular note was the presence of significant neural prim-
ing in left anterior VLPFC during across-task trials, which
stands in contrast to recent proposals that neural priming
in VLPFC reflects stimulus-outcome learning (Horner &
Henson, 2008; Dobbins et al., 2004). Because alternate
pathways to action were not available on AT-RR trials
(no stimulus-decision repetition) nor on AT-RS trials (no
stimulus-decision or stimulus-response repetition), the
observed VLPFC neural priming on across-task trials—as
well as such priming in left middle temporal and fusiform
areas—cannot reflect bypassed processing of stimulus-
level representations in favor of decision or response re-
trieval. As such, these data suggest that neural priming
in these structures may stem from cortical tuning.
Extensive behavioral data indicate that prior stimulus
processing can result in priming at multiple levels of
stimulus representation—perceptual, lexical, and concep-
tual (e.g., Roediger & McDermott, 1993). Because our
paradigm was designed to delineate stimulus-level effects
from stimulus-decision and stimulus-response effects, it
does not permit specification of whether the stimulus-
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level effects observed in left frontotemporal regions
reflect the tuning of conceptual, lexical, and/or percep-
tual representations. However, we note that the localiza-
tion of the observed stimulus-level effects corresponds
with a rich literature implicating these regions in the
representation (left posterior middle temporal and fusi-
form) and controlled retrieval (left anterior VLPFC) of
semantic information, suggesting that these neural prim-
ing effects reflect facilitation at the conceptual level
(Badre & Wagner, 2007; Martin, 2007). In particular,
stimulus-level neural priming in left fusiform and pos-
terior middle temporal cortex is consistent with an
experience-dependent tuning of stimulus-specific con-
ceptual representations that facilitate subsequent pro-
cessing within these regions during repeated access to
stimulus meaning (Simons et al., 2003; Koutstaal et al.,
2001). This tuning of posterior neocortical representations
may constitute a form of experience-dependent predic-
tion, resulting in increased ‘‘bottom–up’’ retrieval of rel-
evant conceptual information. In this manner, posterior
neocortical tuning may serve to reduce demands on the
prefrontal executive system, such that the concomitant
neural priming in left anterior VLPFC reflects a decreased
reliance on or increased efficacy of ‘‘top–down’’ signals
that control semantic retrieval as the recovery of concep-
tual information becomes more automatic (Badre et al.,
2005; Wagner, Pare-Blagoev, Clark, & Poldrack, 2001). This
interpretation complements other evidence documenting
(a) a functional coupling between left anterior VLPFC and
these left temporal cortical areas during conceptual pro-
cessing (Bokde, Tagamets, Friedman, & Horwitz, 2001),
(b) a necessary role of left rostral VLPFC in establishing
neural priming in left posterior temporal cortex (Wig et al.,
2005), and (c) a priming-related increase in neural syn-
chrony between left VLPFC and left posterior temporal
cortex (Ghuman, Bar, Dobbins, & Schnyer, 2008). Future
studies that are specifically designed to test this fronto-
temporal interactive model may shed further light on how
left anterior VLPFC neural priming relates to experience-
dependent changes in posterior temporal cortex.
Although our theoretical focus is on delineating how
learning relates to neural priming in the frontal execu-
tive system, as noted above, the present pattern of neu-
ral priming in left fusiform cortex stands in contrast to
that observed by Dobbins et al. (2004). Specifically,
whereas Dobbins et al. revealed a response-learning ef-
fect in left fusiform cortex, here the predominant fusi-
form priming pattern was consistent with a cortical
tuning effect. Indeed, in the present study, multiple foci
in left fusiform cortex—extending from posterior lateral
(!BA 37/19) to anterior medial regions (!BA 37/20; Fig-
ure 2B; Table 1)—demonstrated significantly reduced
activation in all three repeated conditions (within-task,
AT-RR, and AT-RS) and no significant differences be-
tween these primed conditions (with one exception:
#45, #51, #15, where the dominant effect of cortical
tuning was accompanied by a modest but significant
( p< .05) difference between AT-RS and within-task trials).
Recently, Horner and Henson (2008) reported a similar
pattern of generalized neural priming in left fusiform, rais-
ing questions about the extent of ‘‘response-learning’’ ef-
fects in fusiform gyrus.
The divergence between the present data and those
of Dobbins et al. (2004) may reflect functional hetero-
geneity within left ventral temporal cortex because
the present left fusiform foci do not appear to overlap
with the left fusiform region observed by Dobbins et al.
(!BA 19/37; #24, #57, #15) but rather overlap with
left fusiform regions previously implicated in semantic
processing (Simons et al., 2003; Buckner et al., 2000;
Thompson-Schill et al., 1999). Thus, some subregions in
left fusiform may demonstrate neural priming associated
with stimulus-outcome learning [we also observed a fo-
cal left fusiform region identified in the across-task >
within-task contrast (7 voxels with peak at #48, #54,
#21) that showed a stimulus-decision effect], whereas
other subregions may demonstrate neural priming as-
sociated with cortical tuning (the dominant pattern
observed herein). A critical objective for future inves-
tigation is to determine what differentiates these two
classes of left fusiform subregions (e.g., do they differ-
entially subserve perceptual vs. conceptual processing?;
Simons et al., 2003). Regardless, the present data pro-
vide novel evidence that neural priming in left fusiform,
posterior middle temporal, and anterior VLPFC can re-
flect stimulus-level changes, arguing against the proposal
that the processing of stimulus-level representations is by-
passed in favor of stimulus-outcome retrieval (cf. Horner
& Henson, 2008; Dobbins et al., 2004).
Decision-specific Priming in Left VLPFC
Neural priming in left mid and posterior VLPFC is greater
when the same semantic task or decision rule is per-
formed during initial and repeated stimulus processing
relative to when the task or rule is changed (Horner &
Henson, 2008; Dobbins et al., 2004; Wagner, Koutstaal,
et al., 2000; Thompson-Schill et al., 1999). Because de-
cision and response repetition were not independently
manipulated in prior studies, it has remained unclear
whether this neural priming effect reflects a processing
benefit stemming from retrieval of learned stimulus-
decision or stimulus-response mappings. Delineating
the level at which ‘‘response learning’’ operates has im-
plications for theories of neural priming (Schacter et al.,
2007) and automaticity (Logan, 1990) as well as models
of prefrontal executive control (Badre & Wagner, 2007;
Fuster, 2001).
The present experimental design isolated the contri-
butions of decision learning from response learning, en-
abling the first test of whether neural priming in left
VLPFC reflects reduced demands on stimulus-decision or
stimulus-response mapping. Strikingly, in left mid/post-
VLPFC regions that appeared to fall at or near the left
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VLPFC regions previously reported to be sensitive to
some aspect of ‘‘stimulus-response’’ learning (Horner
& Henson, 2008; Dobbins et al., 2004), we observed
neural priming that was selective to the one condition
in which stimulus-decision (or stimulus-task) mappings
were repeated (i.e., within-task trials). Accordingly, the
present data provide novel evidence that experience-
dependent activity reductions in left mid/post-VLPFC re-
flect processing benefits that stem from stimulus-decision
learning rather than from stimulus-response learning or
stimulus-level priming.
The stimulus-decision effect in left mid/post-VLPFC func-
tionally dissociated from the stimulus-level effect in left
anterior VLPFC (Figure 2E). This dissociation is consis-
tent with Badre and Wagner’s (2007) two-process model
of left VLPFC executive function and demonstrates that
different forms of learning can reduce processing de-
mands in distinct regions of PFC. Specifically, although
neural priming in left anterior VLPFC likely reflects re-
duced demands on controlled semantic retrieval, neural
priming in left mid/post-VLPFC likely reflects reduced
demands on selection of an appropriate classification
decision. That is, when a stimulus is already associated
with a goal-relevant decision, two sources of evidence
may favor this decision during subsequent stimulus
classification—namely, retrieved semantic knowledge
supporting the decision and retrieved stimulus-decision
associative knowledge. The availability of this second
source of learned evidence further favors activation of
the relevant decision, thus reducing decision-level un-
certainty and demands on left mid/post-VLPFC selec-
tion processes (Thompson-Schill, D’Esposito, Aguirre, &
Farah, 1997).
This interpretation of decision-level priming in left
mid/post-VLPFC is in accordance with research associ-
ating activity in this region with interference resolution
during task switching (e.g., Badre & Wagner, 2006;
Braver, Reynolds, & Donaldson, 2003; Dove, Pollmann,
Schubert, Wiggins, & von Cramon, 2000). During task-
switching paradigms, the ability to switch from one task
to a second is argued to require configuration of the
present task set as well as resolution of proactive in-
terference from the previous task set (Wylie & Allport,
2000; Rogers & Monsell, 1995; Allport, Styles, & Hsieh,
1994). Interference on switch trials can be triggered by
‘‘task set priming,’’ wherein a bivalent stimulus serves to
reactivate the stimulus-task rule mappings formed dur-
ing the preceding trial (Brown, Lehmann, & Poboka, 2006;
Waszak, Hommel, & Allport, 2004; Sohn & Anderson,
2003; Waszak et al., 2003). Recent fMRI data indicate that
the magnitude of left mid-VLPFC activation on switch trials
tracks the magnitude of decision-level interference but
not response-level interference (Badre & Wagner, 2006).
When viewed from this perspective, the present stimulus-
decision neural priming effect in left mid-VLPFC may re-
flect the benefit of reduced decision-level conflict due to
facilitative priming from the learned stimulus-decision as-
sociation. Moreover, whereas the task-switching literature
has focused primarily on how left mid-VLPFC resolves con-
flict following short-term learning (e.g., Badre & Wagner,
2006; see also, Badre & Wagner, 2005; Bunge, Ochsner,
Desmond, Glover, & Gabrieli, 2001; Jonides, Smith,
Marshuetz, Koeppe, & Reuter-Lorenz, 1998), the present
data demonstrate that long-term stimulus-decision asso-
ciative memory can also alter demands on this form of
cognitive control (Thompson-Schill et al., 1999).
The present findings suggest that a reinterpretation
of previously reported task-specific and across-task PFC
neural priming effects is necessary (Wagner, Koutstaal,
et al., 2000; for related behavioral effects, see Thompson-
Schill & Gabrieli, 1999; Vriezen, Moscovitch, & Bellos,
1995). For example, a prior fMRI study of within-task
(semantic ! semantic) and across-task (perceptual !
semantic) repetition observed (a) reduced activation in
left mid-to-anterior VLPFC (!BA 45/47) only during the
within-task condition and (b) reduced activation in left
post-VLPFC/premotor (!BA 44/6) during both within-
and across-task repetition (Wagner, Koutstaal, et al.,
2000). Although the task-specific effect in left rostral
PFC was originally interpreted as revealing that neural
priming in this region depends on having previously ac-
cessed semantic knowledge—an interpretation that re-
mains viable for left anterior VLPFC (!area 47)—the
present data suggest that the absence of an across-task
effect in left mid-VLPFC (!BA 45) was early evidence
that stimulus-decision learning drives neural priming in
this region. Moreover, whereas the across-task effect in
left caudal PFC was originally argued to reflect priming
at the lexical/phonological level because the stimulus-
response mappings were held constant on 50% of the
across-task trials, this effect is compatible with the pres-
ent observation that neural priming in caudal PFC stems
from stimulus-response learning (see below).
Another intriguing aspect of the present data is that
they raise the possibility of interactive effects across dif-
ferent levels of the prefrontal executive system (Botvinick,
2007; Koechlin & Summerfield, 2007). In particular, al-
though neural priming in left anterior VLPFC was signif-
icantly modulated by stimulus-level learning (Figure 2B–
C), the magnitude of neural priming in this region was
also significantly greater when decisions were repeated
(within-task) than when decisions changed (across-
task). One possibility is that this decision-level effect in
anterior VLPFC reflects partial voluming due to variable
functional-anatomic overlap across subjects. Alterna-
tively, and more interestingly, this finding might reveal
feedback from decision-level processing regions onto
conceptual processing regions that occurs when direct
retrieval of a goal-relevant stimulus-decision mapping
is unavailable as a source of evidence for decision se-
lection (i.e., on across-task trials). This feedback from
decision-level to conceptual-level executive processing
regions may up-regulate the conceptual executive sys-
tem that biases recovery of semantic knowledge that is
Race, Shanker, and Wagner 1777
relevant to decision selection. Consistent with this in-
terpretation, whereas all repeated conditions demon-
strated neural priming in left anterior VLPFC and left
fusiform when the BOLD response was measured from
3.0 to 7.5 sec post-stimulus onset (i.e., surrounding the
peak of the response), the across-task conditions also
showed a more sustained response extending into the
7.5- to 10.5-sec period (Figure 3). This late separation
between across-task and within-task trials may reflect
the greater decision uncertainty inherent in the former
condition, such that feedback from the decision level
temporally extends engagement of processing at the con-
ceptual level. Although this interpretation is speculative
and awaits testing on data with higher temporal reso-
lution, this proposal is compatible with interactive mod-
els of cognitive control (Botvinick, 2007; Koechlin &
Summerfield, 2007) and may offer an account for previ-
ously reported outcome-level influences on neural prim-
ing in left anterior VLPFC (Horner & Henson, 2008).
Response-level Repetition and Neural Priming
The possible contributions of response repetition to neu-
ral priming during semantic classification, independent of
decision-related repetition, have been largely unexplored.
By isolating effects of response repetition, the present data
provide novel evidence that stimulus-response learning
modulates subsequent demands on the frontal executive
system. Specifically, when learned responses remained
goal-appropriate, regardless of whether stimulus-decision
mappings were held constant (within-task) or switched
(AT-RR), neural priming was observed in caudal portions
of lateral frontal cortex (left premotor/post-VLPFC) and
medial frontal cortex (left pre-SMA). This finding provides
evidence that neural priming in these regions reflects the
benefits of facilitated response selection—that is, when
retrieval of a learned stimulus-response association pro-
vides additional evidence in favor of the goal-relevant re-
sponse, demands on caudal frontal executive processes
that subserve response selection decrease (Simmonds,
Pekar, & Mostofsky, 2008; Badre & D’Esposito, 2007;
Picton et al., 2007; Koechlin & Jubault, 2006; Botvinick,
Nystrom, Fissell, Carter, & Cohen, 1999). Moreover, the
response-learning effect in left premotor/post-VLPFC
functionally dissociated from (a) the decision-level ef-
fect observed in left mid/post-VLPFC regions and (b) the
stimulus-level effect observed in left anterior VLPFC. Thus,
the present data revealed a functional triple dissociation
in lateral frontal cortex, indicating that multiple types of
learning yield distinct computational savings along the
rostrocaudal extent of left frontal cortex.
In addition to the facilitation that stems from retrieving
learned goal-relevant stimulus-response mappings, the
current results also revealed a processing cost when re-
trieved responses conflict with the current goal-relevant
action. Specifically, neural activity increased in left PMd
when responses switched from study to test (AT-RS) com-
pared with when they did not (all other conditions). This
activity increase may reflect a form of ‘‘negative priming’’
(Waszak & Hommel, 2007; Waszak et al., 2003; Thompson-
Schill et al., 1999), wherein a retrieved stimulus-response
association conflicts with the goal-relevant response, caus-
ing response competition. Evidence for response com-
petition was also evident in subjects’ accuracy scores,
which were significantly reduced on AT-RS compared
with all other conditions. Although it is unclear why com-
petition effects were selectively observed at the response
level—in theory, one might also predict such effects at
the decision level—these effects nevertheless suggest that
additional mechanisms are required to override prepotent
response tendencies or that left PMd represents active
response representations. In support of the former con-
clusion, prior studies have associated activity in left pre-
motor cortex with inhibitory control (Watanabe et al.,
2002; Kiefer, Marzinzik, Weisbrod, Scherg, & Spitzer,
1998). Together with the response facilitation effect in
left premotor/post-VLPFC, these data suggest that the dor-
sal and the ventral subregions of premotor cortex make
distinct contributions to action selection (Hoshi & Tanji,
2007).
Extending Hierarchical Models of
Executive Control
The present dissociable neural priming effects in lateral
frontal cortex lend support to models of cognitive
control that posit that hierarchically organized execu-
tive functions depend on the rostrocaudal axis of lateral
frontal cortex (Badre & D’Esposito, 2007; Koechlin &
Summerfield, 2007; Koechlin & Jubault, 2006; Fuster,
2001). By this view, regions proximal to motor cortex
select ‘‘acts and programs of movement’’ closest to re-
sponse output, whereas increasingly ‘‘higher’’ levels
of representation that select ‘‘plans’’ and ‘‘concepts’’
map to progressively more anterior regions of lateral
PFC (Fuster, 2001). Consistent with this perspective, the
present neural priming data revealed conceptual-level
effects localized to anterior VLPFC, decision-level ef-
fects localized to mid/post-VLPFC, and response-level ef-
fects localized to premotor/post-VLPFC. These findings
suggest that the hierarchical organization of lateral fron-
tal cortex is not restricted to dorsal frontal structures;
rather, a parallel hierarchy may extend from premotor
through VLPFC structures. Future studies are required
to systematically test whether responses along this ven-
trolateral pathway obey hierarchical principles.
Locus of Learning and Relation to
Behavioral Priming
The present response-level and decision-level neural
priming effects raise the question as to the locus of
such stimulus-outcome learning. One possibility is that
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stimulus-outcome learning reflects the development of
long-term representations within PFC (e.g., Wood &
Grafman, 2003). Alternatively, frontal neural priming ef-
fects may reflect changes in long-range interactions be-
tween PFC and posterior structures, as evidenced by
enhanced interregional neural synchrony with repeated
stimulus processing (Ghuman et al., 2008; Schacter
et al., 2007). Finally, recent neuropsychological data also
indicate that stimulus-outcome priming effects at least
partially depend on medial-temporal lobe (MTL) mecha-
nisms that support associative memory because patients
with MTL damage demonstrate stimulus-level but not
stimulus-outcome behavioral priming (Schnyer et al.,
2006). An important issue for future research is to deter-
mine whether the MTL is necessary for stimulus-decision
priming, stimulus-response priming, or both.
The multiprocess nature of the observed repetition ef-
fects also suggests that a complex relationship may exist
between neural priming and behavioral priming. For ex-
ample, although we observed significant neural priming
on AT-RS trials in left anterior VLPFC and left fusiform
regions (Figures 2C and 3), we did not observe signifi-
cant behavioral priming on AT-RS compared with novel
trials. One possibility is that this behavioral pattern in-
dicates a lack of stimulus-level learning. However, the
observed stimulus-level neural priming effects would ap-
pear to argue against such an interpretation. Alternatively,
it is possible and even more likely that RTs are influenced
by multiple processes, some facilitative and others disrup-
tive. From this view, the absence of a behavioral priming
effect in the AT-RS condition may reflect the effects of
stimulus-response conflict that offset any stimulus-level
facilitation. At the neural level, AT-RS trials were associ-
ated with both stimulus-level neural priming in multiple
regions as well as stimulus-response ‘‘negative’’ neural
priming in left PMd, lending support for this latter inter-
pretation. More broadly, the multiprocess nature of prim-
ing may make one-to-one mappings between specific
neural priming effects and changes in RT difficult, possi-
bly accounting for why significant correlations between
the magnitudes of neural priming and behavioral prim-
ing were not observed (but see, Horner & Henson, 2008;
Dobbins et al., 2004; Maccotta & Buckner, 2004).
Conclusion
Computational demands in the present are affected by
predictive evidence derived from the past. The current
study provides novel evidence that the past provides pre-
dictive evidence at multiple levels—stimulus, decision,
and response—that are likely to be relevant to present
stimulus-to-action mapping. This predictive evidence re-
duces computational demands along the rostrocaudal
axis of lateral PFC, revealing a topographically organized
prefrontal executive system that reaps the benefits of dis-
tinct forms of experience-dependent learning.
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